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ABSTRACT 
 
Beauvoir’s project in The Second Sex is to reach an understanding of how woman as the 
Other can attain a sense of agency. She sees the principal obstacle as women’s essentially 
and inescapably passive sexual nature. I contend, however, that by ignoring the issue of 
desire and its role in the choice of sexual partners and sexual practices, Beauvoir has not 
appreciated both the active dimension of female sexuality and one of the fundamental 
constraints on female sexual choice.  
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THE PROBLEM OF DESIRE: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR AND ‘THE LESBIAN’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In her 1990 critique of Simone de Beauvoir’s chapter on ‘The Lesbian’ in The Second Sex, Ann Ferguson 
alleges that ‘… the weakness of [Beauvoir’s] approach is to ignore the social and historical meaning of a lesbian 
identity in order to focus on the individual choice of sexual preference.’i There appear to be two quite separate 
issues involved here. The first rests on the distinction made between lesbian practices (women making love to 
women) and lesbian identity as a social identity organised around homosexual object choice. The second is the 
issue of choice itself—Ferguson sees women’s choices as constrained by social and material conditions, and 
accuses Beauvoir of ignoring this fact in her emphasis on the individual.ii While correct in this accusation in the 
sense that Beauvoir does not, indeed, provide a social and historical analysis of lesbian identity, I think 
Ferguson has misapprehended the actual nature of Beauvoir’s central project in The Second Sex. Ferguson 
identifies this as ‘a feminist appropriation of an Existentialist metaphysic to analyse motherhood as a biological, 
economic and social institution which perpetuates male dominance cross-culturally.’iii Instead, I see Beauvoir’s 
central preoccupation as being with the question of woman as the Other attaining a sense of agency, escaping 
the state of being object to become subject, moving from immanent to transcendent, contingent to autonomous, 
inessential to essential. ‘How can a human being in woman’s situation attain fulfilment?’ she asks.iv Beauvoir is 
less concerned about the materiality of a lesbian existence, and more concerned with the central drama of 
authentic existence.v That being said, Ferguson is right to point out how social and historical conditions do 
affect this drama by structuring subject–object ways of thinking. However, I will argue that the chief weakness 
of Beauvoir’s approach to the lesbian is not so much her neglect of historical and social conditions, but rather 
her failure to engage with the subject of desire, which is crucial to any sense of sexual choice, and thus of 
agency. 
 
LESBIAN PRACTICES / LESBIAN IDENTITY 
 
The Australian Study of Health and Relationships (ASHR), conducted in 2001-2002, involved computer-
assisted telephone interviews with a representative sample of 9,134 women aged 16-59 years throughout 
Australia. 97.7% identified as heterosexual, 0.8% as lesbian or homosexual, and 1.4% as bisexual. However, 
15.1% of women reported some same-sex attraction or experience.vi Figures like these underpin the important 
distinction Ferguson makes between lesbian practice and lesbian identity. Clearly there are many thousands of 
Australian women who have engaged in lesbian practices who still consider themselves heterosexual. Lesbian 
sexual practices do not guarantee a permanent movement from object to subject, nor do they necessarily 
constitute a radical and enduring form of political resistance to patriarchal oppression.vii  
 
Ferguson argues that it is only the modern notion of lesbian identity, and the collective and social bonding of 
women into an oppositional subculture, made possible by recent social and economic changes, that offer women 
the genuine possibility of individual choice. While this is undoubtedly true for all but a few independently 
wealthy women, I do not see this as a major problem for Beauvoir’s analysis. Her understanding of the freedom 
of choice is anchored in an acknowledgement of social context. 
 
The truth is that homosexuality is no more a perversion deliberately indulged in than it is a curse of fate. 
It is an attitude chosen in a certain situation—that is, at once motivated and freely adopted. No one of the 
factors that mark the subject in connection with this choice—physiological conditions, psychological 
history, social circumstances—is the determining element, though they all contribute to its explanation.viii 
 
Beauvoir’s examination of ‘The Lesbian’ is not a sociological study of a social phenomenon, but rather a 
philosophical meditation on self and agency. Her emphasis on choice is part of the broader existentialist concern 
with liberty and transcendence. 
 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS 
 
The Second Sex provides a comprehensive and exhaustive treatment of the social and historical conditions that 
have resulted in the compulsion for women to assume the status of the Other.ix Beauvoir explores fields as 
diverse as biology, psychoanalysis, literature and economics, from pre-agricultural societies up until her own 
time. By situating her chapter on ‘The Lesbian’ in book two, ‘Woman’s Life Today,’ and especially in part IV, 
‘The Formative Years’, she indicates that her focus will be on the psychodynamic process of female identity 
formation, rather than the social and historical specificities of lesbian identity.x Her interest in this chapter is to 
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understand why some women outgrow this ‘stage’ while others make ‘a definite choice of homosexuality.’xi In a 
passage I take to be central to her argument, she says: 
 
The truth is that there is never a single determining factor; it is always a matter of a choice, arrived at in a 
complex total situation and based upon a free decision; no sexual fate governs the life of the individual 
woman: her type of eroticism, on the contrary, expresses her general outlook on life. xii 
 
Beauvoir does admit that environmental circumstances influence this choice, such as gender-segregated 
schooling, occupations, living arrangements, having other creative outlets, social class, and education.xiii 
Nevertheless, her main interest is in how homosexuality offers one way, among others, for women to solve the 
problems inherent in their ‘condition in general’ which Beauvoir believes stems specifically from women’s 
‘erotic situation.’xiv Ferguson alleges that Beauvoir offers an essentialist reading of the biological facts of 
heterosexual coitus, but Beauvoir’s account strikes me as informed by a classic Freudian reading of those facts, 
particularly with relation to the male principle as ‘active’ and the female as ‘passive.’xv Indeed it is this Freudian 
version of female sexuality that occludes Beauvoir’s vision of woman as a desiring subject and thus a fully 
autonomous human being. More recent developments in psychoanalytic theory make room for cultural 
influences; Person argues that cultural material, along with the lived experiences of individuals, infuse our 
intrapsychic lives, shaping our desires, reframing our fantasies, and becoming part of the unconscious.xvi This 
accords with Ferguson’s criticisms in the sense that for women to choose a sexual preference they must first be 
aware of new pathways through which to express their deepest wishes and needs and to create new life 
trajectories. In adopting an essentialist psychoanalytic reading of female and male sexuality, Beauvoir sees no 
need to address these issues. 
 
THE PROBLEM OF DESIRE 
 
In fact, Beauvoir’s Freudian reading of female sexuality leads her to the conclusion that there must be a 
fundamental conflict for women between an ‘active personality’ and their sexual role; the active ‘virile’ woman 
must choose between assuming or repudiating her normal sexuality.xvii The word ‘normal’ seems to be used in 
the sense of ‘free from mental or emotional disorder’ rather than simply ‘regular, usual, typical.’xviii Beauvoir 
adds ‘… the lesbian may often wish she were a normal and complete woman while preferring not to be,’ and she 
describes a lesbian who penetrates her partner by ‘artificial means’ as a ‘castrate’—‘She is unfulfilled as a 
woman, impotent as a man, and her disorder may lead to psychosis.’xix For Beauvoir, female sexual agency must 
always be a violation of woman’s true nature and thus come at the cost of healthy psychological integration. 
 
Thus the ‘choice’ to be lesbian, for Beauvoir, is largely a negative one - a rejection of femininity and of 
intimacy with men. Every adolescent female, she contends, fears penetration and masculine domination.xx The 
lesbian simply refuses to make the sacrifices of liberty and autonomy required by femininity; she declines ‘to 
abdicate in favour of another human being.’xxi Women with projects of their own ‘do not propose to waste time 
in playing a feminine role or in struggling with men.’xxii ‘The lesbian, in fact, is distinguished by her refusal of 
the male and her liking for feminine flesh … the female body is for her, as for the male, an object of desire.’xxiii 
However, for Beauvoir this liking for feminine flesh is not an active desiring; all young women are naturally 
homosexual in the sense that they are repulsed by the male body and, like men, they prefer the softness and 
gentleness of the female, recalling their initial attachment to the mother.xxiv Beauvoir’s descriptions of lesbian 
sexuality stress its passive and gentle qualities. Women with an active personality, she contends, are looking for 
relaxation, appeasement and diversion in sexual pleasure. Eroticism plays only a small part in lesbian sexuality: 
female sex pleasure is less ‘violent and vertiginous’ than that between men and women; women’s carnal 
affection is more even, has more continuity, is characterised by ‘tranquil pleasure’, rather than ‘frenetic 
ecstasies.’xxv Two key passages explore her understanding of lesbian sexuality and are worth quoting in full: 
 
Between women there is complicity that disarms modesty; the excitement that one arouses in the other is 
generally without violence; homosexual caresses imply neither defloration nor penetration: they satisfy 
the clitoral eroticism of childhood without demanding new and disquieting changes. The young girl can 
realise her vocation as passive object without feeling herself deeply alienated.xxvi 
 
  Between women love is contemplative; caresses are intended less to gain possession of the other than 
gradually to re-create the self through her; separateness is abolished, there is no struggle, no victory, no 
defeat; in exact reciprocity each is at once subject and object, sovereign and slave; duality becomes 
mutuality. Says Colette in Ces plaisirs: ‘The close resemblance gives certitude of pleasure. The lover 
takes delight in being sure of caressing a body the secrets of which she knows, and whose preferences her 
own body indicates to her.’xxvii 
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The consequences of this view of lesbian sexuality is to make its choice a relatively easy and straightforward 
matter. Although she is at pains to declare that lesbianism is not a case of arrested development as many 
psychoanalysts would allege, Beauvoir clearly views it as an ‘easy option’, a refusal to engage in the real 
challenge of establishing an authentic self in relation to the sovereign subject ‘man.’xxviii She portrays lesbian 
sexuality as essentially narcissistic, and this assumption that all women’s bodies work in the same way, that 
knowing one’s own body means one automatically knows how to please another woman, makes woman-on-
woman sexual practice simply a variant of auto-eroticism, a kind of mutual objectification, rather than an 
engagement with the Other. However, I would argue that same-sex eroticism removes the illusion that the 
chasm between us and the Other is simply due to gender and forces us to face the alterity of all others. Levinas 
asserts the ‘absolute difference’ between myself and the Other, deriving from the fact that no universal concept 
or general category serves to unite us.xxix All the Other and I have in common is that we have nothing in 
common.xxx However, by accepting the Freudian view that all female sexuality is essentially passive, Beauvoir 
seems to me to ignore the role of desire in a woman’s ability to choose another woman as a sexual partner, and 
to choose an erotic life, and thus a mode of existence, free of male domination. 
 
Sartre defines the essential existentialist project in the following terms: human beings are forced to be free and 
to creatively make themselves, their individual essence, and they do so by adopting freely chosen projects.xxxi 
This seems to me to accurately portray my transition to a lesbian identity. After studying feminism for a while, I 
came to the conclusion that heterosexuality was no place for a self-respecting feminist, and so I “decided” to 
become a lesbian. I must stress that I understood this at the time as a political decision, and I did not expect it to 
ever be manifested in the flesh, so to speak: after 22 years of marriage I had no expectation that anyone would 
ever again find me sexually attractive, and so I reconciled myself to the idea of celibacy—except in fantasies, 
where I “chose” to send my imagination down new erotic pathways. When the marriage finally ended and I was 
able to put these fantasies to the test, I was fortunate to find that the realities were congenial to me. However, I 
have talked to many heterosexual women who express a kind of rueful regret that, much as they would like to be 
lesbians, they cannot cope with the idea of physical intimacy with a woman. Is this merely “false 
consciousness”—what Rich calls ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality’?xxxii Certainly the women themselves see it 
more as an expression of their essential identity, which they are powerless to change. 
 
Conversely, for many gay and lesbian people, especially those who have been in heterosexual marriages, they 
see their choice to ‘come out’ and live their gay identity, as coming from their need for authenticity—they feel 
an overwhelming need for their actions to reflect what they feel to be their “inner” reality, and often they feel 
impelled to this decision by what they experience as the increasing psychic dissonance between an essential, 
“given” nature and a lived-experience at variance with it.xxxiii To suggest that they could choose otherwise, and 
by their choices to creatively make an essence for themselves, as Sartre seems to be saying, they find oppressive 
and insulting—this is exactly what some Christians say, and many of these people have tried for 20 years and 
more to do exactly that, without success. Their same-sex desire has consistently overwhelmed them and finally 
they feel they must acknowledge and accept it, or kill themselves. Beauvoir hints at this problem, but again only 
in passive form, when she discusses women who believe that they ‘will not derive pleasure from heterosexual 
relations.’xxxiv 
 
Sartre himself speaks of desire as though it conquers our power to choose: ‘it seems that one is invaded by 
facticity;’ ‘we say that it takes hold of you, that it overwhelms you, that it paralyses you;’ ‘Desire is not only the 
desire of the Other’s body; it is … the … lived project of being swallowed up in the body …’xxxv What I find has 
bedevilled my attempts at lesbian relationships is the unruliness of desire—I find myself sexually desiring 
people who are completely inappropriate long-term partners, and unable to feel desire for those with whom I am 
most compatible in every other way. Is this simply evidence of a disordered subconscious, or something to do 
with pheromones, as the biological essentialists would have it?xxxvi In any case, it seems to me that desire resists 
the Sartrean project of making an essence for ourselves by our freely chosen actions, and thus for Beauvoir’s 
notion of the individual choice of sexual preference. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ferguson critiques Beauvoir’s examination of lesbian sexuality chiefly on the grounds that Beauvoir presents 
this as a mode of resistance to male domination which is freely chosen by individual women. By failing to 
acknowledge the role of historical and social conditions in shaping and defining women’s choices, sexuality and 
sense of self, Ferguson believes that Beauvoir neglects the essential grounds that make the choice of lesbian 
identity, and thus resistance to patriarchal ideologies, possible. In making these criticisms I believe Ferguson has 
not fully apprehended the nature of Beauvoir’s project in The Second Sex. This project is to reach an 
understanding of how woman as the Other can attain a sense of agency, escaping the state of being object to 
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become subject, moving from immanent to transcendent, contingent to autonomous, inessential to essential. 
Beauvoir sees the principal obstacle to this process as located in women’s fundamental sexual nature, which she 
sees in Freudian terms as essentially and inescapably passive. Thus, in psychoanalytic terms, the choice to 
remain lesbian is a fairly easy one for women, but one that is narcissistic and does not qualify for the Sartrean 
project of making an essence for ourselves by adopting freely chosen projects. I contend, however, that by 
ignoring the issue of desire and its role in choosing sexual partners and sexual practices, Beauvoir has not 
appreciated both the active dimension of female sexuality and one of the fundamental constraints on female 
sexual choice. Neither Sartre nor Beauvoir adequately address the implications of the unruliness of desire for the 
making of “authentic” individual choices, and this is the primary weakness of Beauvoir’s chapter on ‘The 
Lesbian.’ 
 
 
___________________________ 
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